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Positive affect facilitates task switching in the
dimensional change card sort task: Implications
for the shifting aspect of executive function
Hwajin Yang and Sujin Yang
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
Using the modified Dimensional Change Card Sort task, we examined the influence of positive affect
on task switching by inspecting various markers for the costs, including restart cost, switch cost and
mixing cost. Given that the executive-control processes that underlie switching performance—i.e.,
inhibition or shifting—are distinct from the component processes that underlie non-switching
performance—i.e., stimulus evaluation, resource allocation or response execution—we hypothesised
that if positive affect facilitates task switching via executive-control processes, rather than via
component processes, positive affect would reduce both switch and restart costs, but not mixing cost,
because both switch and restart costs rely on executive processes, while mixing cost imposes only
minimal demands on executive processes. We found beneficial effects of positive affect on both restart
and switch costs, but not on mixing costs. These results suggest that positive affect improves
switching abilities via executive processes rather than via component processes.
Keywords: Positive affect; Dimensional change card sort (DCCS); Task switching; Switch cost;
Mixing cost; Restart cost.
One of the most consistent and robust findings
in the affect literature is that mild positive affect
improves cognitive flexibility, which is the ability to
shift attention among relevant ideas and to effec-
tively adjust behaviour based on changing environ-
mental demands (for a review, see Isen, 2008). For
example, positive affect has been found to facilitate
flexible and non-typical categorisation of neutral
stimuli—including neutral person types—without
simultaneous loss of typical categorisation; diverse
and unusual (as well as usual) word associations to
neutral words; flexible consideration of a choice set
of products for purchase; flexible perspective-taking
in interpersonal negotiation; decreased anchoring
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(i.e., more sufficient adjustment and responsiveness
to information); greater integration of information
in reasoning; and flexible control of attention (Isen,
2008). In light of the facilitating effects of positive
affect on flexibility in thinking, the question arises
whether positive affect would also facilitate flexibil-
ity in task switching.
Past research suggests that similar cognitive
processes appear to underlie both cognitive flexib-
ility and task-switching performance. For instance,
the literature on task switching attributes signi-
ficant response-time (RT) costs following a task
switch to the time consumed by the control
processes required for reconfiguration of the task
set (Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003). Likewise,
the affect literature suggests that positive affect
improves cognitive flexibility via controlled pro-
cesses (Carpenter, Peters, Västfjäll, & Isen, 2013;
Gray, 2001; Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2013). Similarly,
the flexibility theory posits that the facilitating
effects of positive affect on cognitive flexibility
occur via changes in both cognitive organisation—
i.e., how multiple aspects of stimuli or ideas are
thought about, related to other ideas and orga-
nised in response to a current goal—and cognitive
elaboration, which refers to a higher degree of
mental effort that involves (1) integration and
analysis of information, (2) active storage and
retention of information and (3) flexible focus
of attention (for discussion, see Isen, 2008,
p. 550). These processes are further postulated to
be related to the aspects of executive functions,
which are the control mechanisms that modulate
the operation of various cognitive processes such as
shifting, updating, monitoring and inhibitory
control (Miyake et al., 2000). Taken together,
both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that
positive affect would improve flexibility not only in
thinking but also in task switching via controlled
processes.
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) were the first to
demonstrate that positive affect promotes flexible
switching of cognitive sets. Their study, however,
focused specifically on the effect brief presentation
of affective stimuli has on switch costs; therefore,
any generalisation of their findings to a subjective
experience of positive affect should be undertaken
cautiously. Moreover, the study employed a task
that was based on a cognitive set-switching para-
digm in which participants performed a single
categorisation task using one colour while ignoring
a distractor in another colour that was presented
simultaneously. Thus, their task differed slightly
from a task-switching paradigm in which partici-
pants are required to rapidly switch between com-
peting tasks based on a bivalent stimulus. Lastly,
Dreisbach and Goschke were primarily concerned
with switch cost. However, given that various types
of costs in a task-switching paradigm have different
origins and neural correlates (Philipp, Kalinich,
Koch, & Schubotz, 2008; Rubin & Meiran,
2005), it is critical to examine the influence of
positive affect in a more finely grained manner by
inspecting various markers for cost type—i.e.,
switch cost, restart cost or mixing cost.
In this study, we examined two primary issues.
First, we induced positive affect and sought to
examine its effect on task-switching performance
using a modified version of the Dimensional
Change Card Sort task (DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, &
Palfai, 1995), in which participants are presented
with bivalent cards depicting familiar objects that
differ on two dimensions such as colour and shape
(e.g., blue trucks and red stars) and asked to sort
cards on one dimension (e.g., shape: blue trucks
with red trucks).1 The sorting rules then change,
and participants are instructed to sort the same
test cards on the other dimension (e.g., colour:
blue trucks with blue stars). This allows us to
examine executive processes such as shifting,
which is the ability to move back and forth among
1The DCCS task has been widely employed to test young children in a developmental context. However, numerous
studies using this task have revealed that switching difficulties can extend well into early adolescence (Morton, 2010) and
young adulthood due to the increased RT required by the executive processes necessary to switch from one task to another
(Diamond & Kirkham, 2005).
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multiple tasks (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), and
inhibitory control, which is the ability to inhibit
dominant, automatic or prepotent responses when
necessary (Miyake et al., 2000).
Second, we aimed to decompose switching per-
formance into three types of cost variables: restart,
switch and mixing, each of which is acknowledged
to involve somewhat different control processes
(Rubin &Meiran, 2005). To this end, we included
three blocks in the DCCS—two pure blocks of
single-task trials and one block of intermixed task-
switch and non-switch trials (Figure 1). The
difference between mean RT for the last two trials
in the first pure block and mean RT for the first
two trials in the subsequent pure block is termed
“restart cost” (Poljac, de Haan, & Van Galen,
2006). The mean RT difference between task-
switch trials and task-repeat (i.e., non-switch)
trials within the mixed block is termed “switch
cost” (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Lastly, the mean
RT difference between task-repeat trials in the
mixed block and corresponding trials in the pure
blocks—in which no switch is made—is termed
“mixing cost” (Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005;
Rubin & Meiran, 2005).
A number of studies suggest that the executive-
control processes employed in the task-switching
paradigm can be functionally independent and
Figure 1. The top panel (A) illustrates the main experimental procedure. Restart cost was calculated by subtracting the mean RTs of the last
two trials of the first dimension (Block 1) from that of the first two trials of the second dimension (Block 2). Switch cost was calculated from trials
within the mixed block by comparing the mean RT of task-repeat trials (P2) with that of task-switch trials (P1). Mixing costs were computed
by comparing the mean RT of the two pure blocks—after discarding the first two trials of each block, which suffered from restart costs—with that
of task-repeat trials in the mixed block. The bottom panel (B) is a schematic depiction of the Dimension Change Card Sort (DCCS) task used
with adults in the study (adapted from Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). CSI, cue-stimulus interval; RCI, response-cue interval.
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dissociated. According to Rubin andMeiran (2005),
these processes include either global control mech-
anisms (i.e., component processes)—which appear
to underlie non-switch tasks—or specific control
mechanisms (i.e., executive-control processes)—
which are involved in switch tasks. Consistent
with this view, the literature has documented
empirical evidence of dissociations. For instance,
Gopher (1996) found that instructions about a
switch influence switching performance but do
not affect non-switching performance. Rubinstein,
Meyer, and Evans (2001) demonstrated that a
warning cue influences non-switching trials with-
out affecting switching trials. Cepeda, Cepeda,
and Kramer (2000) observed that children with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
exhibit disproportionately large switch costs based
on switch trials and normal costs based on non-
switch trials. Taken together, this empirical evid-
ence of dissociations suggests that the control
processes that support switching trials are distinct,
at least in part, from those that support non-
switching trials.
In light of this, we hypothesised that if positive
affect facilitates executive-control processes (i.e.,
inhibition control or shifting) more effectively than
other component processes (i.e., stimulus evalu-
ation, resource allocation or response execution),
positive affect—as compared to neutral affect—
would reduce both switch and restart costs because
they are based on task-switch trials that appear to
tap the specific control processes necessary for
disengagement from one task and preparation for
a subsequent task (Koch et al., 2005). In contrast,
we hypothesised that positive affect does not
moderate mixing cost, because it is based on
non-switch trials that appear to involve processes
that are distinguished from switching processes in
general (Rubin & Meiran, 2005).
METHOD
Participants
Eighty-six undergraduates (males = 33, 18–23
years of age) from Cornell University participated
in exchange for extra course credit. Data from two
participants who had learned English only after
the age of five years were excluded because of
linguistic demands imposed by the Remote
Associates Test (RAT) and Word Completion
Task (WCT), two manipulation checks on
induced mood. Half (n = 42) were assigned to
the positive-affect condition and the other half
(n = 42) to the neutral-affect condition, which
served as a control group.
Design
We manipulated affect (positive, neutral) as a
between-participant factor, and thus assigned par-
ticipants randomly to either the positive-affect or
neutral-affect condition. Preliminary analyses did
not show any effects of gender or order-of-sorting
rules (i.e., colour first or shape first), so these
variables were not included in the reported ana-
lyses. Three types of costs (restart, switch and
mixing) served as dependent variables.
Materials
Mood manipulation check
Induced affect was assessed by unobtrusive manip-
ulation checks, including the RAT and WCT.
Despite the assumed effectiveness of an explicit
mood check that asks participants to indicate the
degree of their current feeling states, such mea-
sures were inappropriate for our purposes because,
given that positive affect was induced by an
unexpected gift, following the gift with an obvious
question about mood could dispel the induced
feeling state by causing participants to mistrust
the experimenter’s intent in giving them the gift
(Isen & Erez, 2007).
In the RAT, a person is required to think of a
word that is related to each of three other words
presented—for instance, “Cadet”, “Capsule” and
“Ship” (answer: Space). In all, 21 RAT items of
moderate difficulty were selected from the norm-
ative data of Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003).
The WCT requires participants to complete a list
of word fragments with missing letters. We
expected that compared to neutral affect, positive
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affect would enhance performance on both the
RAT and WCT for two reasons. First, the literat-
ure has consistently reported a strong relationship
between mild positive affect and improved per-
formance on the RAT and WCT, and second,
both measures are related to cognitive abilities
such as verbal fluency, association and insightful
problem-solving, all of which have been shown to
improve under positive affect (Isen & Erez, 2007).
DCCS
The DCCS was modelled after the one used by
Diamond and Kirkham (2005). In the task, the
target picture (either a blue truck or red star)
appeared in the centre of the screen, and partici-
pants were asked to sort the target by a previously
specified rule (Figure 1). Two reference pictures
(a red truck and a blue star) remained visible at the
bottom of the screen throughout the test, with
the red truck at the bottom left and the blue star at
the bottom right. Neither of the target pictures
matched a reference picture on both colour and
shape. The location of the reference pictures
corresponded to the location of the response key
to press to reduce memory load in the task. An
explicit cue (colour or shape) appeared on every trial
between the two reference pictures at the bottom of
the screen, indicating the sorting criterion.
Procedure
Positive affect was induced by giving participants
an unexpected gift—a small bag of candy that was
attractively tied with a piece of yarn—as a token of
appreciation for their participation. The gift was
presented before testing began, but participants
were asked to put the gift away with their books
and take it with them when they left the lab. This
was done to minimise potential demand charac-
teristics by ensuring that participants would not
eat the candy and associate it, during the session,
with the purpose of the study. Participants in the
neutral condition did not receive the gift and were
unaware of its presence. We strove, however, to
ensure equivalent levels of interaction between
participants and the experimenter by following
the same behavioural protocol (e.g., the same
verbal expression of thanks). The RAT was then
administered to assess the effectiveness of the
induced affect as an implicit manipulation check.
Next, a computerised version of the DCCS was
administered. The test consisted of three blocks:
two pure blocks of a single sorting task (based on
either colour or shape) and one mixed block of two
tasks—i.e., both colour and shape tasks intermixed
within the block. The order of the three blocks
was fixed, with the two pure blocks administered
prior to the mixed block, since the mixed block is
perceived as being more difficult than the pure
blocks, and performing different tasks of increas-
ing difficulty is believed to be less disruptive of
cognitive performance and induced affect (Yang
et al., 2013). The two pure blocks consisted of
15 task-repeat trials each, and the mixed block of
30 trials that included both task-switch and task-
repeat (i.e., non-switch) trials. In the mixed block,
two sorting tasks alternated every two or three
trials, resulting in 18 repetition trials [i.e., AA(A)
or BB(B)], and 12 switch trials (e.g., AB or BA),
with a task probabilistic ratio of roughly 1.5:1.
This rendered task switching unpredictable.
Each trial began with a cue specifying the trial’s
sorting rule. When the cue was preceded by the
target picture, the participant sorted the target
picture by pressing a corresponding response key
as accurately and quickly as possible, and RT in
milliseconds was measured from the appearance of
the target picture to the key press. Throughout all
DCCS trials, the cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI)
and the response-to-cue interval (RCI) were fixed
to 500 ms and 800 ms, respectively. The order-of-
sorting criteria between the pure blocks (i.e.,
colour first and shape second, or vice versa) and
within the mixed block were counterbalanced
across participants. After this, the WCT was
administered as another mood check to ensure
that induced mood remained effective until the
end of the study. Upon completion of the study, a
funnel questionnaire was administered to examine
participants’ awareness of research hypotheses,
suspicions about the study, and, during task
switching, choice of spontaneous strategies (i.e.,
YANG AND YANG
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An independent-samples t-test was performed on
the RAT, which was administered immediately
after affect induction. As hypothesised, partici-
pants in the positive-affect condition performed
significantly better (M = 11.1, SD = 3.8) than
those in the neutral-affect condition (M = 7.5, SD
= 4.7), t(82) = −3.57, p < .001, Cohen’s d = −.079.
Consistently, another independent-samples t-test
on the WCT—which was administered after the
DCCS task—revealed that the positive-affect
group outperformed the neutral-affect group,
t(82) = −2.02, p = .046, Cohen’s d = −.044.
Together, these results demonstrate that the
method used to induce positive affect was effective
and that participants in the positive-affect condi-
tion felt more positive throughout the test than
those in the control condition.
Performance costs
We present separate analyses of RT data for each
type of performance cost below. Only correct trials
were included; the rare RTs that were either more
than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean or less
than 200 ms were discarded (4% of total trials),
which is a typical practice in the literature. Error
rates were not further analysed, because they were
consistently low; did not correlate with RTs, r(84) =
.033, p > .76; and showed no difference between the
two affect conditions, t(82) = .7, p > .5.
Restart cost
Using Diamond and Kirkham’s method (2005),
restart cost—which refers to the initial slowing
after the switch to a different sorting dimension—
was computed from the two pure blocks by
comparing the average RT of the last two trials
in the first dimension (Block 1) with that of the
first two trials in the second dimension (Block 2).
Analyses using different intervals of either one or
three trials immediately before and after the switch
did not change the general data pattern, and thus
were not reported.
RT data were submitted to a mixed-factor
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with affect (posit-
ive, neutral) as a between-participant factor and
task-restarting (last two trials in Block 1, first two
trials in Block 2) as a within-participant factor.
Consistent with Diamond and Kirkham (2005),
we found the main effect of task-restarting,
indicating significantly elevated RTs when switch-
ing from the first to the second dimension,
F(1, 78) = 7.34, p = .008, η2 = .09 (Figure 2a).2
This main effect interacted with affect, suggest-
ing that positive affect significantly modulated
restart costs, F(1, 78) = 3.8, p = .05, η2 = .04.
Planned comparisons revealed that restart costs
were eliminated in the positive-affect condition,
p > .59, but not in the neutral-affect condition,
t(39) = −3.3, p < .01, Cohen’s d = −1.05. This
suggests that compared to neutral affect, positive
affect enhances switching efficiency as reflected
in restart costs.
Switch cost
Switch cost refers to RT difference between task-
switch trials and task-repeat trials within the
mixed block (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Switch
cost was analysed in the mixed block only as
recommended in the recent literature, because
pure blocks differ from mixed blocks in terms of
working-memory demands, division of attention
between perceptual dimensions, degree of arousal
and effort and so on (Rubin & Meiran, 2005).
The first two trials in the mixed block were
2Note that the degree of freedom for restart costs differs from that of either switch or mixing costs. The loss of degree of
freedom for restart costs occurred when trials (i.e., the last two or first two trials of pure blocks) that were used for the
calculation of restart costs were discarded due either to errors or RT trimming, which was done for each individual, using
individuals’ means and SDs within each of the three blocks.
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excluded because they were known to suffer from a
form of restart cost that is typically present
immediately following a task switch. Each trial in
the mixed block was defined relative to its position:
P1 (Position 1 = switch trial), P2 (Position 2 =
first-repeat trial) and P3 (Position 3 = second-
repeat trial). Because preliminary analyses showed
minimal drops in RT between P2 and P3, we
combined them as P2 and calculated switch cost
by comparing task-switch trials (P1) with task-
repeat trials (P2 and P3 combined).
RT data were submitted to a mixed-factor
ANOVA with affect (positive, neutral) as a
between-participant factor and task-switching
(P1, P2) as a within-participant factor (Figure 2b).
Switch costs were found, F(1, 82) = 45.8,
p < .001, η2 = .66, with significantly slower RTs
on P1 (task-switch trials) than on P2 (task-repeat
trials). A significant affect × task-switching inter-
action suggests that positive affect significantly
modulated switch costs, F(1, 82) = 4.7, p = .03,
η2 = .033, with attenuated switch costs in the
positive-affect group (MP1–P2 = 114 ms) compared
to the neutral-affect group (MP1–P2 = 214 ms).
Planned comparisons revealed that the group
difference was caused by the positive-affect group’s
faster RTs on switch trials (P1; Mpositive = 1088
ms, Mneutral = 1299 ms), t(82) = 1.98, p = .05. The
two groups, however, did not differ on task-repeat
switch trials (P2; Mpositive = 975 ms, Mneutral =
1085 ms), p > .2. Consistent with results for
restart cost, this suggests that positive affect
enhances task switching, which appears to tap
executive-control processes.
Mixing cost
Mixing cost refers to impaired performance on
task-repeat trials in the mixed block compared to
performance on task-repeat trials in pure blocks, in
which no switch is made (e.g., Koch et al., 2005).
Mixing costs were computed by comparing mean
RTs of task-repeat trials in the two pure blocks
with those of task-repeat trials in the mixed block.
Note that the first two trials of each block were
excluded due to restart cost. RT data were
submitted to a mixed-factor ANOVA with affect
(positive, neutral) and task-mixing (task-repeat
trials in pure blocks, task-repeat trials in the mixed
block). Mixing costs were significant (Figure 2c),
with poorer performance in the mixed block
Figure 2. Panel A shows restart cost as a function of induced affect. Restart cost was based on RT difference when switching from the first
sorting dimension in Block 1 to the second sorting dimension in Block 2. Panel B shows switch cost based on RT difference between task-
repeat and task-switch trials within the mixed block (Block 3). Panel C shows mixing cost based on RT difference between task-repeat trials
in pure blocks and those in the mixed block.
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(M = 1032 ms) than in the pure blocks (M = 601
ms), F(1, 82) = 131, p < .001, η2 = 1.6. This effect,
however, did not interact with affect,
F(1, 82) = 2.13, p = .149, indicating that positive
affect did not modulate mixing cost, which
appears to impose minimal demands on executive
processes.
In summary, compared to neutral affect, positive
affect significantly enhanced switching efficiency—
as evidenced by restart and switch costs—but it
did not modulate mixing cost.
Motivational effects
We investigated whether the observed effects of
positive affect can be attributed to motivational
factors. First, we examined RT to index any group
differences in effort. A series of t-tests, however,
showed no difference in the overall RT, t(82) =
.94, p = .35, or averaged RTs in Block 1, t(82) =
−.32, p = .75; Block 2, t(82) = .55, p = .59; or the
mixed block, t(82) = 1.6, p = .11. We also
determined whether the affect groups differed in
RT on all trials that were used to compute various
performance costs (Figure 1). Again, the two
affect groups did not significantly differ in aver-
aged RTs for trials involved in computing restart
costs, t(78) = .41, p = .53; switch costs, t(82) =
1.69, p = .095; or mixing costs, t(82) = .92, p =
.34, suggesting that the effect of positive affect
cannot be attributed to the positive-affect group’s
seemingly faster responses.
Second, given the potential link between
motivation and strategic orientation, we examined
the funnel questionnaire to determine whether the
two groups differed based on the spontaneous
strategies they adopted. The chi-square test
showed that the two affect groups did not differ
in terms of strategies that involved either heigh-
tened focus on the currently relevant cue, χ2(1) =
1.9, p = .16, or intentional ignorance of the
irrelevant cue, χ2(1) = 2.4, p = .12. We also
created a variable that combines the two strategies.
This variable coded the participant into one of
three groups: those who used neither of the two
strategies (coded as 0), either one of the two
strategies (coded as 1) or both strategies (coded as
2). Despite the trend towards the positive-affect
group’s use of both strategies, the chi-square
test was still consistent with our previous result,
χ2(2) = 4.35, p = .114, indicating no significant
association between induced affect and choice of
spontaneous strategies.
We also conducted simple moderation analyses
based on regression coefficients to examine choice
of strategy as a moderator. When a series of simple
moderation models were performed using a macro
process generated by Hayes (2012), we found that
positive affect emerged as a significant predictor
for both restart and switch costs, but not for
mixing costs. However, neither of the two strat-
egies (i.e., heightened focus on the relevant cue or
intentional ignorance of the irrelevant rule) sig-
nificantly moderated the effect of positive affect on
restart costs (ps > .11), switch costs (ps > .31) or
mixing costs (ps > .79).
Third, we considered the possibility that giv-
ing an unexpected gift (i.e., a small bag of hard
candies) could motivate participants in the posit-
ive-affect group to behave in the way they assumed
the experimenter wanted them to. In view of this
potential influence of demand characteristics, we
examined our funnel questionnaire, which asked
participants to guess the study’s purpose and to
report any suspicions about the study. The major-
ity of participants (95.3%) in the positive-affect
condition, however, had no ideas about the
purpose of the gift, and even those who reported
being suspicious of the gift failed to associate it
with the study’s hypothesis. Moreover, in view of
the absence of explicit incentives or rewards
associated with task performance, it is less likely
that extrinsic motivation—which is typically dri-
ven by external rewards—moderated the effect of
positive affect on performance costs. Taken to-
gether, there was not enough evidence to infer the
influence of motivational differences.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found that positive affect had a beneficial
effect on restart and switch costs, but not on
mixing costs. This suggests that positive affect
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facilitates effective use of the control processes
necessary to rapidly switch to a relevant task goal
while simultaneously inhibiting an irrelevant task
goal. It is also notable that the effect of positive
affect was selective; it did not influence mixing
costs calculated from non-switch trials, presum-
ably because they impose fewer demands on
executive processes. Given the view that the
cognitive processes that underlie mixing cost may
be different from those underlying either restart or
switch costs (Cepeda et al., 2000; Koch et al.,
2005; Rubin & Meiran, 2005), this evidence of
dissociation implies that the main locus of positive
affect’s facilitating effects would likely lie in
controlled abilities, such as those required to
flexibly shift between tasks, override the tendency
to produce an overlearned response or deal with
potential proactive interference caused by bivalent
stimuli, as opposed to component processes, such
as simple abilities to retain multiple-task rules,
evaluate perceptual stimulus or allocate resources.
In any event, given that switching and inhibition
functions are central to DCCS switch trials, our
results point to improved flexibility in executive
processes as the primary factor that explains the
observed affect-related changes in restart and
switch costs.
Our findings replicate and substantiate the
observed link between positive affect and switch-
ing flexibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), by
delineating the effect of positive affect on various
types of switching variables. Our finding is also
consistent with Isen’s (2008) flexibility theory,
which posits that positive affect facilitates flexible
and careful cognitive processing through changes
in cognitive organisation and cognitive elabora-
tion. The neuropsychological theory of positive
affect is also compatible with our findings, as it
postulates that positive affect improves executive
processes through the release of dopamine into the
frontal regions of the brain (Ashby, Isen, &
Turken, 1999). Lastly, Fredrickson’s broaden-
and-build theory (2001) is compatible with our
findings, to the extent that her theory
conceptualises positive emotions as being linked
to flexibility in attention control (since people
perceive broadly and build on that).
Our findings are not readily explained, however,
by the affect-as-information theory, which posits
that positive affect signals an absence of problems
in the environment, resulting in heuristic rather
than systematic processing strategies (Schwarz,
2002). This theory predicts that positive affect will
impair switching performance, because controlled
processes are impaired under positive affect. These
ideas are not supported by our findings. It should
be noted, however, that the discrepancy may be
attributable in part to differences in design and
implementation, such as the nature of the task (fun
or dull) or the motivational intensity of induced
positive affect (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008).
Cue-priming effects
Given that the DCCS is based on a 1:1 cue-task
mapping (one cue per task) in which task switch
and cue switch always co-occur, it is difficult to
determine the relative contributions of task switch-
ing and cue switching to performance costs (for a
review, see Logan & Bundesen, 2003). In con-
trast, several researchers who employed an explicit
task-cueing procedure based on 2:1 cue-task
mapping (two cues per task) have claimed that
task switching can be triggered not only by
executive control but also by basic cue-priming
processes that underlie cue switching. A recent
study, however, suggests that differences in switch
costs calculated from tasks with either 1:1 or 2:1
mapping are small and non-significant in most
analyses (Schneider & Logan, 2011). Although it
is still controversial whether switch costs based on
1:1 mapping would solely be attributed to cue
priming but not to executive control (for a review,
see Altmann, 2006; Altmann & Gray, 2008), we
acknowledge that the locus of the observed mood
affect should be considered in light of both
cognitive control (which underlies task switching)
and basic cue-priming processes.3 Below, we
3We thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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present some reasons to believe that our observed
effect of positive affect is attributable to cognitive
control rather than to basic cue-priming processes.
First, it is notable that the DCCS is a widely
used measure of executive function (for a review,
see Zelazo, 2006), because successful performance
on the DCCS requires more endogenous control
than exogenous control. For example, a typical
explicit-cueing paradigm requires the subject to
judge single digits by either magnitude (greater or
less than 5) or parity (odd or even), whereas the
DCCS requires not only judgement about a
bivalent stimuli (i.e., in terms of either colour or
shape) but also use of an ability (i.e., inhibitory
control) to match the target stimulus to a model
picture that embodies conflict with the correct
response. In support of this, recent brain-imaging
studies suggest that the DCCS implicates execut-
ive processes. For example, Waxer and Morton
(2011), using event-related potentials (ERPs),
demonstrated that ERPs time-locked to the
instruction cue revealed a late frontal negativity
whose amplitude was greater for switch trials
relative to repeat trials and was associated with
the magnitude of the behavioural switch cost
(p. 3267), indicating that the DCCS taps execut-
ive processes.
Second, it is noteworthy that among a number
of procedural differences between typical task-
cueing paradigms and the DCCS, the former
usually employ several hundreds of trials, ranging
between 320 and 960 (e.g., Logan & Bundesen,
2003), whereas the DCCS requires far fewer
trials, thereby reducing the potential effects of
practice—for instance, 80 trials in the adult
version of the DCCS used by Diamond and
Kirkham (2005). Given this, it is likely that the
task-cueing procedure is subject to the influence
of repetition priming, which is prone to become
established through a greater number of trials. By
contrast, the DCCS is less likely to rely on such
priming, as performance with limited practice
tends to require the ability to engage controlled
processes.
Third, if the observed mood effect is attribut-
able to cue-encoding benefits, we argue that such
benefits should be manifested by well-strategised
use of the cue. Thus, we examined whether the
two affect groups differed in terms of cue-focused
strategies, as assessed by the dichotomous items on
the funnel questionnaire. The chi-square test,
however, revealed that the two affect groups did
not differ in choice of strategies involving heigh-
tened focus on the currently relevant cue, χ2(1) =
1.9, p = .16, or intentional ignorance of the
currently irrelevant cue, χ2(1) = 2.4, p = .12. These
results suggest that the two mood groups did not
differ in use of the cue, which could lead to cue-
encoding benefits.
Lastly, although the DCCS does not allow us
to accurately determine the influence of positive
affect on the cue-priming processes that underlie
cue switching, we examined whether there was a
systematic influence of positive affect on the
temporal pattern of RT facilitations (i.e., RT
drops over time) on task-repeat (non-switch) trials
within the pure and mixed blocks. Given that cue-
priming effects operate when cue-encoding bene-
fits are established through the same cues that are
repeatedly presented, RT facilitation on task-
repeat trials can be used as an index of basic
priming effects (e.g., Arrington, Logan, &
Schneider, 2007). Accordingly, we first examined
the influence of cue priming in the pure blocks by
breaking trials of each pure block into three bins
spanning five trials each (Bin 1, trials 1–5; Bin 2,
trials 6–10; Bin 3, trials 11–15). When RT data
were submitted to a 2 (order of pure blocks: first,
second) × 2 (affect: positive, neutral) × 3 (Bin:
first, second, third) mixed-factor ANOVA with
affect as the only between-participant variable, we
found main effects of Order and Bin and an
interaction between Order and Bin. These effects
indicate that averaged RT was faster for the
second pure block than the first pure block, F(1,
76) = 48.9, p < .001; averaged RT of Bin 1 was
slower than the other bins, F(2, 152) = 96.5, p <
.001; and the significant RT drop from Bin1
relative to both Bin 2 and Bin 3 was more
pronounced in the first pure block than in the
second pure block. If positive affect exerted a
different influence on cue priming, we would
expect to find interaction effects with affect.
None of the interactions involving affect, however,
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were significant. This suggests that both positive
and neutral-affect groups were under similar levels
of priming influence in the pure blocks.
Next, the cue-priming effect in the mixed block
was approximated by examining RT facilitation
across four different clusters of trials in which the
same task cue as the preceding one appeared
repeatedly in a row [i.e., first-repeat (P2) and
second-repeat (P3) trials]. When RT data were
submitted to a 2 (affect) × 2 (cue-repetition: P2,
P3) × 4 (clusters: C1, C2, C3, C4) mixed-factor
ANOVA, a significant three-way (affect × cue-
repetition × clusters) interaction was found, F(3,
141) = 3.06, p = .03. Additional follow-up analyses
revealed significant two-way (affect × cue-repetition)
interactions in the first two clusters (C1 and C2),
but not in the last two clusters (C3 and C4),
indicating that affect modulated cue priming only
in the first half of the mixed block. Further
analysis, however, revealed that positive affect
significantly facilitated RT between P2 and P3 in
the first cluster, t(66) = 2.94, p = .004, whereas
it significantly impeded RT between P2 and
P3 in the second cluster, t(75) = −2.3, p = .02,
suggesting that positive affect did not consis-
tently modulate cue priming in the mixed block
(Note that because P2 and P3 were yoked to
calculate RT facilitation, the elimination of either
one of those task-repeat trials—due to errors or
RT trimming—resulted in different degrees of
freedom for each cluster).
In addition, a 2 (affect) × 2 (task switching;
task-switch trials, task-repeat trials) analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) was performed with cue
priming (i.e., mean RT facilitations between task-
repeat trials across all clusters) as a covariate. We
found that cue priming did not significantly influ-
ence RTs in the mixed block, F(1, 81) = .08, p =
.78; neither did it interact with task switching,
F(1, 81) = .32, p = .57. Moreover, the effect of
positive affect on switch costs was still substantial,
even after controlling for the effect of cue priming
as a covariate, F(1, 81) = 3.44, p = .06, indicating
that the effect of cue priming was not associated
with switch costs. Taken together, these results
suggest that our finding regarding the effect of
positive affect on task switching is attributable less
to cue priming than to executive processing.
CONCLUSION
In summary, our results demonstrate that mild
positive affect alleviates difficulty in disengaging
from one task and switching to another via
improved controlled processes of executive func-
tion. The possibility that the difference between
the groups’ performance was caused by changes in
memory processing is not plausible, because
response icons remained visible on-screen through-
out the testing to minimise maintenance demands
on working memory and to control for individual
differences in working-memory capacity. More-
over, the possibility that similar cognitive abilities
underlie both the RAT and task switching—
which jeopardises the independence of the mood
check from the DCCS—is less likely. The literat-
ure suggests that performance on the RAT is
negatively related to the attentional-control abilit-
ies at the core of task-switching performance,
because lowered attentional control facilitates a
transition from a goal-directed behaviour to a
more associative and creative mode (for a review,
see Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). Thus, if the same and
unitary attention-control process underlies both
the RAT and the DCCS, enhanced performance
on the RAT should be associated with impaired
task switching in the DCCS. Our findings,
however, markedly contrast to this hypothesis.
Given the view that executive processes are multi-
faceted (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000), our findings
suggest that different executive processes, although
not mutually exclusive, may be associated with the
RAT (e.g., attentional control) and the DCCS
(e.g., shifting and inhibition control).
It is notable that the unexpected-gift paradigm,
which was used to induce positive affect in the
study, may implicate motivational mechanisms at
the origin of control tasks. While there was a lack
of evidence (i.e., overall RT, extrinsic motivation
or demand characteristics), at least in our study,
to infer that motivation modulated the effect of
positive affect, our findings warrant future studies
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to delineate how motivation interacts with positive
affect to influence our cognition and behaviour.
Additionally, future studies should examine the
scope and limits of affect-related changes in task
switching to identify underlying processes and
shed additional light on the relation between
positive affect and various switching abilities.
The specific controlled processes—e.g., attentional
shifting, inhibition control, monitoring, cue prim-
ing or updating—that underlie a facilitating effect
of positive affect on task switching should also be
addressed. Since task switching is regarded as a
shifting aspect of executive function—which is
implicated in the performance of a wide-ranging
group of cognitive and social processes—our
finding that positive affect improves task-switch-
ing performance via executive processes means
that this affective state has the potential to
improve a multitude of social and non-social
processes in everyday functioning.
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